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CARS AS AN APPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR
COMMUNICATION? EXPLORING "THE SHORT,
THOUGH REGULAR, JOURNEY"* FROM THE
WINDSHIELD TO THE PAVEMENT
NICOLE RUBIN**
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are walking to your car after a long, exhausting day at
the office. You climb into the driver's side and immediately turn on the
heat to combat the dark, cold night from which you have just temporarily
escaped. As you are pulling out of the parking garage, you notice an
advertisement on your windshield for the grand opening of a new nail salon
in town. The advertisement is all too familiar - last week you received the
same one advertising the impending opening, the week before your
windshield promoted drink specials for a nightclub. Do you start thinking
about the constitutional right to freedom of speech, or are you frustrated
that you have found yourself frantically turning on your windshield wipers
to dispose of this flier, once again, before you get onto the highway?
This hypothetical scenario recently has become the subject of spirited
legal debate.1 While the Supreme Court has protected solicitations that are
distributed door-to-door,2 courts have struggled to figure out how much
protection this particular kind of speech-speech that is contained by your
* Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), summarily aff'd 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967)). In
that case, the Court struck down restrictions on unsolicited mailed advertisements, rationalizing that the
"short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can" was an acceptable burden to place on those
unwilling to receive such speech. Id. This Note suggests that, with regard to vehicle leafleting, the true
final destination for this kind of speech is not the trash can, but the street.
** J.D. Candidate, May 2011, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2008, University of Florida.
1 See infra Part 11.
2 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (striking down a ban on door-to-door
distributions of literature); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (voiding an ordinance that, in
part, prohibited door-to-door leafleting); Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 151-52 (2002) (invalidating a permit requirement for door-to-door canvassers).
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car windshield-should receive. So far, Circuit Courts are split regarding
the constitutionality of vehicle leafleting bans.3 All have applied a three-
part test, resembling intermediate scrutiny, for determining the
constitutionality of a time, place, or manner restriction, but have reached
different outcomes. 4 This is because the constitutionality of time, place,
and manner restrictions is governed by the nature of the place where the
speech occurs, and courts have been conflicted as to what type of forum a
private vehicle parked on a public street or in a parking lot constitutes. 5 For
the purposes of analyzing time, place, and manner regulations, courts have
likened vehicles with either the public forum or private property. Most
recently, in Klein v. City of San Clemente, the Ninth Circuit considered
vehicles private property, and invalidated a municipal ban on vehicle
leafleting by analogizing cars to homes, a place where leafleting
traditionally has been protected.6 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Horina
v. City of Granite considered vehicles private property and struck down
vehicle leafleting regulations, rejecting the government's argument that
automobiles were nonpublic fora. 7 These cases stand in contrast to the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, which also
considered a vehicle private property but upheld a ban on vehicle leafleting
because there is no "traditional right of access" to a car windshield. 8 In yet
another case, the Eighth Circuit in Krantz v. City ofFort Smith did not even
reach the issue of what type of forum vehicles should constitute for the
purpose of free speech analysis because both parties conceded that vehicles
parked on public streets and parking lots were public fora, and not private
property. 9
This Note argues that courts are using the wrong forum classification for
vehicles in analyzing ordinances that ban vehicle leafleting. Vehicles
parked on city streets and in city parking lots should be considered
nonpublic fora-not private property and not public fora-for the purposes
of free speech analysis, and thus subject to rationality review.10 There are
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part II.
5 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (holding that the nature of a place
determines the reasonableness of time, place, and manner regulations); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (finding that the government's control of a speaker's right to
access is based on the nature of the property).
6 584 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2009).
7 538 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2008).
8 409 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005).
9 160 F.3d 1214 (8th Cir. 1998).
10 CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 46 (3d ed. 2009)
(explaining that under rationality review, the challenger has the burden of proving that the regulation is
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several reasons why vehicles are more appropriately classified as nonpublic
fora rather than private property or public fora. First, vehicles are not
analogous to homes, which have been classified as private property. The
government has more control over vehicles, there is no traditional right of
access to vehicles, and there are other alternatives available for leafleters to
reach car owners. Second, the amount of government control over vehicles
is similar to the government's control over private mailboxes, which have
been considered nonpublic fora in free speech jurisprudence. Third,
vehicle leafleting ordinances are legitimate exercises of a local
government's police power. Local governments deserve deference in this
regard because they are in the best position to effectively balance the
general needs of the citizens within their territories. Lastly, deferring to
municipalities by subjecting vehicle leafleting ordinances to rationality
review will bring uniformity to judicial treatment of vehicle leafleting bans.
While courts differ as to whether litter prevention is a significant interest,
all have agreed that litter prevention is a legitimate interest.11
Part I of this Note provides a historical overview of the development of
the public forum doctrine, and explores how courts traditionally have
regarded leafleting within each forum. Part II of this Note examines how
Circuit Courts have divided in evaluating the constitutionality of municipal
bans on vehicle leafleting. Part III of this Note argues that vehicle
leafleting regulations should be analyzed under the nonpublic forum
doctrine, which would subject the ordinances to rational basis review.
I. THE HISTORICAL PROTECTION AFFORDED TO TRADITIONAL PUBLIC
FORA AND TRADITIONAL LEAFLETING
This Section will explain the history of two areas of free speech that
customarily have received protection by the courts: speech that occurs in a
traditional public forum and speech expressed by traditional leafleting.
While these two areas of speech are not the only types of speech that have
been given protection, they are among the types of speech that are
considered so historically important to the free expression of ideas as to
render them deserving of the highest level of constitutional protection.
Even for these two highly protected forms of speech, courts have
not rationally related to a legitimate government objective, and noting that this form of review is
deferential to the government); Mwagile v. Holder, 374 F. App'x 809, 816 (10th Cir. 2010) (clarifying
that, in a rational-basis review, the party challenging the legislation bears the burden of "negativ[ing]
every conceivable basis which might support it.").
1I See infra Part II.
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determined that some government regulation is permissible. For example,
speech restrictions in nonpublic fora as well as restrictions that further
significant government interests in maintaining the health and safety of
citizens have been upheld.12 Thus, this Section provides an overview of the
types of government restrictions that have been considered acceptable by
the courts, as well as the kinds of regulations deemed unacceptable by
courts.
A. Public v. Nonpublic Fora
a. Speech on Property That Has Been Considered a Public Forum
The public forum doctrine originated in Hague v. CIO,13 where the Court
recognized that "[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public" and held
that "[s]uch use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens."l 4
It is well established that streets and parks are traditional public fora for
speech,' 5 but any place that has been devoted to public expression by
tradition or government authorization could be considered a traditional
public forum. 16 Once a traditional public forum is implicated, the Court
will usually apply strict scrutiny to the government's regulation of
speech.17
In 1946, the protection of free speech on public property was expanded
beyond the traditional forum of public streets and parks in Marsh v.
Alabama.18 Although the appellant, a Jehovah's Witness, was distributing
literature on a sidewalk, Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation privately owned
the sidewalk.19 The Court held that under some circumstances, privately
12 See infra Part I.A.2, I.B.2.
13 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
14 Id. at 515.
15 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 163 (1939) (stressing the duty of municipal
authorities to keep their communities' streets "open and available" for the people, since this is the
primary purpose to which the streets are dedicated and because streets are the "natural and proper
place[] for the dissemination of information and opinion"); Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
16 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (describing
traditional public fora as "places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate. . ."); Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
17 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (stating that in traditional public fora, "the rights of the state to limit
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed."); see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180
(1983) (mentioning "[t]raditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First
Amendment protection.. .").
18 326 U.S. 501, 502-03 (1946).
19 Id.
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owned property may be considered publicly held for free speech purposes
when such places were "accessible to and freely used by the public in
general," and there was nothing to distinguish them from public places. 20
After Marsh, the Court considered places such as privately owned shopping
centers21 and auditoriums in privately owned buildingS22 to be public
places for the purposes of free speech analysis.
The civil rights movement further extended the concept of the public
forum by creating constitutional rights of access to public places where
speech and protest were not the primary functions of the property. 23 For
example, in the 1961 decision of Garner v. Louisiana, speech protection
was provided to black students who staged a sit-in at a whites-only lunch
counter.24 Four years later, First Amendment protection was given to
protestors conducting a peaceful sit-in at a public library in Brown v.
Louisiana.25 In 1972, the Court struck down regulations of a demonstration
in front of a high school in Grayned v. City of Rockford.26 Thus, the
evolution of the public forum preceded the Court's decision in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association27 in 1983,
which formally classified the various types of public fora into three distinct
categories: the traditional public forum,28 the limited public forum, 29 and
the nonpublic forum.30
20 Id.
21 Almagamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 319
(1968) (providing speech rights in a privately-owned shopping center).
22 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (striking down restrictions of a speech
delivered in a Chicago auditorium).
23 See Eric D. Strand, Constitutional Law-The Supreme Court's Misapplication of Public Forum
Doctrine Creates Governmental Veto of Political Speech by Ballot-Qualified Candidates-Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 331, 346 (1998) ("Corresponding with
the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court extended its public speech
analysis beyond the traditional forum of streets and parks."); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the
Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 112 (1986) ("A
significant factor. . . in expanding public forum was the civil rights movement of the 1960s.").
24 368 U.S. 157, 173-74 (1961).
25 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143 (1966) ("A State or instrumentality may, of course,
regulate the use of its libraries or other public facilities. But . . . [i]t may not invoke regulations as to
use . . . as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in lawful, constitutionally protected exercise of their
fundamental rights."); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (protecting a
protest on statehouse grounds).
26 408 U.S. 104, 118 (1972) (protecting speakers' access on or "adjacent to" school grounds).
27 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
28 See supra note 17.
29 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. A limited public forum is public property that the government
intentionally designates for "use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Id.
30 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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b. Speech on Property That Has Been Considered a Nonpublic Forum
Courts have held that the government's rights in nonpublic fora are
''most analogous to that of a private owner," and that the government
therefore enjoys "maximum control over communicative behavior." 31
Nonpublic fora may be subject to prohibitions of speech, leafleting,
picketing, or other forms of communication without running afoul of the
First Amendment, 32 because government regulations in nonpublic fora
need only be reasonable. 33 Accordingly, the character of the property to
which speakers seek access determines the extent of First Amendment
protection the speech will receive, because strict judicial scrutiny will be
applied to speech regulations in public fora, and rational-basis review will
be applied to speech regulations in nonpublic fora. 34
The foundation for the nonpublic forum doctrine was laid in 1967 in
Adderley v. State of Florida,35 where the Court gave state officials the
power to stop demonstrations on public jailhouse grounds, and found that
the "State, no less than a private owner of property, has the power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated." 36 Sixteen years later, the Court in Perry formally defined the
nonpublic forum as public property that is "not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication." 37 Perry held that an interschool mail
system used by a school district was a nonpublic forum because it was not
31 Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 69.
32 See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981)
(upholding a ban on depositing unstamped papers in mailboxes, because such mailboxes were not a
public forum); see also Philip L. Hirschhorn, Noncommercial Door-To-Door Solicitation And The
Proper Standard Of Review For Municipal Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1139, 1149 (1987) ("Unlike the public or the limited public forums, there is no constitutional right
of access to nonpublic forums.").
33 Public property that is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication is
governed by a "reasonableness" standard. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. The govemment may restrict speech in
a nonpublic forum "as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because [of the speaker's vre most relevant in the vehicle icular message the speech
conveys, are considered content-based restricts and are subject to the highest form of scrutiny. U.S. v.
Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989).
34 See Members of City Council of City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814
(1984) ("[Tihe 'existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations
upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue."')
(quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 44)).
35 385 U.S. 39 (1967).
36 Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47.
37 Id. at 46; see also Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (defining
nonpublic fora as places which, "by tradition, nature, or design, are not appropriate platforms for
unrestrained communication-military installations and federal workplaces, for instance, fall into this
category.").
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open for use by the general public. 38
After the unofficial creation of the nonpublic forum doctrine in Adderley,
the Court went on to consider other public places nonpublic fora.
Government regulations were upheld in military bases, 39 charity drives for
federal employees,40 utility poles on public streets,4 1 residential
mailboxes, 42 the sidewalk outside a post office, 43 and the advertising space
on city buseS44 because these all were deemed nonpublic fora.
In the 1981 decision of United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic
Association, the Court recognized that the First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property "simply because it is owned or controlled by
the government." 45 The Court acknowledged that the question of whether a
particular piece of personal or real property owned or controlled by the
government is a public forum is a blurry one, but nonetheless held that
residential mailboxes were nonpublic fora for free speech purposes. 46 Thus,
the Court upheld a statute that prohibited depositing unstamped matter into
residential mailboxes. 47 The Court accepted the government's justifications
for the challenged statute, including the protection of mail revenues, the
efficient and secure delivery of mail, and the protection of postal
customers' privacy. 48 The Court reasoned that although the postal customer
38 Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. The Court went on to note that "[ilmplicit in the concept of the nonpublic
forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity." Id.
at 49.
39 See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 684, 686 (1985) ("Military bases are not generally
public fora . . . [t]here is 'no generalized constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute
leaflets' on military bases, even if they are generally open to the public."') (quoting Flower v. United
States, 407 U.S. 197, 838 (1976)); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (upholding government
regulations that banned all political speeches and demonstrations on a military base and holding that
military bases were nonpublic forums).
40 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804 (holding that the
government did not violate First Amendment rights of various advocacy organizations by excluding
them from participation in a charity drive, because the drive was a nonpublic forum and "the principal
function of the property would be disrupted by [the] expressive activity[.]").
41 See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (noting that
the application of the public forum doctrine to utility poles was inappropriate, because 'the First
Amendment does not guarantee access to government property simply because it is owned or controlled
by the government."') (quoting U.S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129
(1981)).
42 See supra note 27.
43 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (distinguishing post office sidewalks
from public sidewalks because they were not traditionally open to the public for speech related
activities, and upholding a regulation prohibiting solicitation on postal property because post office
sidewalks were nonpublic fora).
44 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1974) (concluding that car card
space on a city transit system was not a public forum).
45 453 U.S. at 129.
46 Id. at 132.
47 Id. at 133-34.
48 Id. at 117.
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paid for the "physical components" of a mailbox, the mailbox was not
purely private property because the customer also agreed to abide by the
Postal Service's regulations in exchange for the Postal Service agreeing to
deliver and pick up his or her mail. 49 The Court further explained that
while people are not required to become postal customers, those that do
wish to receive and deposit their mail do so under the direction and control
of the Postal Service. 50 Finally, the Court concluded that there was "neither
historical nor constitutional support for the characterization of a [mailbox]
as a public forum," because access to mailboxes had been unlawful since
1934 "except under the terms and conditions specified by Congress and the
Postal Service."si This further distinguished these authorized depositories
from traditional public forums such as streets and parks.52
Relying on Greenburgh's rationale, the Court in Members of the City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent upheld ordinances that forbid posting
signs on public utility poles because the challengers failed to demonstrate
"a traditional right of access respecting such items ... for purposes of their
communication comparable to that recognized for public streets and
parks." 53 The Court considered the government interest of avoiding "visual
clutter" as an acceptable justification for the ordinance, 54 recognizing that
at some point, the government's relationship to things under its dominion
and control is "virtually identical to a private owner's property in the same
kinds of things[.]"55 The Court reasoned that the mere possibility that
government property can be used as a vehicle for communication did not
necessarily mean that the Constitution mandated such uses to be allowed. 56
Hence, both Vincent and Greenburgh illustrate the difficulty the Court has
had in determining whether public property constitutes a public or a
nonpublic forum.
B. Leafleting Regulations
Traditional leafleting is a form of expression where individuals offer
handbills, pamphlets, advertisements, notices, and other information to
49 Id. at 128.
50 Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 125-26.
51 Id. at 128-29.
52 See id. at 130-31.
53 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984).
54 Id. at 816-17 (holding that the state has a legitimate interest in property's esthetic value because
the condition of the environment affects the value of property and quality of life).
55 Id. at 815 n.3 1.
56 See id. at 814 (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
129 (1981)).
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individuals on the street or sidewalk who remain free to accept or reject the
documents. 57 Leafleting, in its traditional form, has a powerful history.58
Colonists like Thomas Paine and Paul Revere regularly utilized this method
of communication because it was the only way to express their opposition
to England during the American Revolution. 59 This history explains why
courts have given special solicitude to this form of communication, which
in the past has been used by those who would not otherwise have been able
to express their ideas.60 Courts as well as scholars have recognized that
leafleting is an inexpensive and efficient way to disseminate information to
a large audience. 61
a. Impermissible Government Regulations of Leafleting
The Supreme Court has made clear that bans on door-to-door leafleting
are invalid.62 In its 1943 decision in Martin v. City of Struthers, for
example, the Court held that whether leafleters are permitted into private
homes depends upon "the will of the individual master of each household,
and not upon the determination of the community." 63 Similarly, four years
57 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 809-10; see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1939) (noting
that some recipients of leaflets announcing a protest meeting, threw the materials on the sidewalk and
into the street).
58 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943) (observing that the distribution of
religious literature is a long held tradition of missionary evangelism, "as old as the . . . printing
presses."); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (discussing the importance of leaflets in
American history).
59 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452 ("[Plamphlets and leaflets ... have been historic weapons in the defense
of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest."); JOSEPH
M. SCHEIDLER, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION 35 (Life Cycle Books 1985) ("During the
American Revolution, the colonists were expert in the use of the leaflet; people like Tom Paine and
Paul Revere regularly printed articles and handed them out to people. Since the press at that time was
under the sway of England . . . . [i]f the colonists wanted to express their views on independence or
some other facet of English oppression, they had to resort to the leaflet.").
60 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Distribution of circulars is essential
to the poorly financed causes of little people."); U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Can. Ltd., 1999 Can.
Sup. Ct. Lexis 52, 31 ("The distribution and circulation of leaflets has for centuries been recognized as
an effective and economical method of both providing information and assisting rational persuasion.");
GARY MINDA, BOYCOTT IN AMERICA: How IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY SHAPE THE LEGAL MIND
119 (Southern Illinois University Press 1999) ("In the case of... leafleting, the courts have recognized
the importance of extending constitutional coverage to protect the communicative conduct of groups.").
61 See cases cited supra note 60; SCHEIDLER, supra note 63, at 36 (acknowledging that some
people see leafleting as the "poor man's way" to distribute information); see also RICHARD K. TAYLOR,
BLOCKADE: A GUIDE TO NON-VIOLENT INTERVENTION 166 (Orbis Books 1977) (pointing out that
leafleting is easy to do); Shaun Parker, The History Of Leaflet Distribution (2008),
http://www.articlesbase.com/direct-mail-articles/the-history-of-leaflet-distribution-477265.html
(explaining that during the Holocaust the Nazi government used leafleting to widely propagate false
information about the Jewish community).
62 See Martin, 319 U.S. at 149 (striking down an ordinance that forbade ringing a doorbell or
otherwise summoning a resident to the door to receive handbills); Schneider, 308 U.S. at 165
(invalidating an ordinance that forbade door-to-door leafleters).
63 Martin, 319 U.S. at 141.
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earlier, the Court in Schneider v. State recognized that the most effective
way to ensure that individuals have notice of leaflets is to focus their
"distribution at the homes of the people."64
The Court in Schneider also struck down bans on leafleting in public
streets. 65 The Court found that the government's interests in "keeping the
streets clean and of good appearance" was insufficient to justify an
ordinance that prohibited a person from "handing literature to [those]
willing to receive it.66 Likewise, in Jamison v. Texas, which was decided
the same year as Martin, the Court held that one who is rightfully on a
street that the state has left open to the public has the constitutional right to
express his views in an orderly fashion, including through leafleting. 67
Courts have also struck down licensing requirements for leafleters. 68 In
1938, the Court in Lovell v. City of Griffin voided an ordinance that forbade
distributing by hand any literature without the written permission of the
city manager. 69 The Court concluded that regardless of the government's
motive, penalties of license and censorship should not be imposed to
abridge the freedom of speech. 70 In 2002, the Court in Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton voided similar licensing
requirements for door-to-door leafleting, describing the requirement that
citizens first inform the government of their desire to speak to their
neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so as "offensive" to the First
Amendment. 71 Thus, like traditional leafleting, door-to-door leafleting has
received substantial protection by the Court.
b. Permissible Government Regulations of Leafleting
Despite the protection afforded to traditional leafleting, courts also have
indicated that the reserved police powers of the States permit them to
64 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). It is also important to note that one of the statutes
at issue in Schneider banned the distribution of handbills to passengers in any street car, and prohibited
persons from throwing, placing or attaching "any hand-bill in, to, or upon any automobile or other
vehicle," but the Court did not address this particular issue because it only reached as-applied
challenges to leafleting door-to-door and on public sidewalks. Id. at 154.
65 Id. at 163.
66 Id
67 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943).
68 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(striking down an ordinance that prohibited canvassers from going door-to-door in residential
neighborhoods without a permit); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (invalidating an
ordinance prohibiting the "distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any
manner without a permit").
69 303 U.S. at451-52.
70 Id. at 451.
71 536 U.S. at 165-66.
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impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on leafleting. 72 As a
result, courts have upheld some regulations of leafleting activities as
constitutional, recognizing that privacy rights and state interests can, in
certain circumstances, outweigh First Amendment rights. 73
For example, in the 1988 decision of Frisby v. Schultz, the Court held
that a municipal ordinance that banned picketing and leafleting "before or
about the residence . . . of any individual" was constitutional, because it
served a significant government interest in protecting residential privacy
and only prohibited targeted picketing and leafleting that took place in front
of a particular home.74 Seven years earlier, significant government interests
were also held to justify restrictions on speech in Heffron v. International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, where a state fair restricted leafleting to
assigned booths. 75 The Court considered the state interest in maintaining
the orderly movement of crowds at the fair a sufficient time, place, and
manner restriction on the First Amendment right to distribute literature. 76
The States' police power to "protect the health and safety of their
citizens" also has been used to justify restrictions on free speech in the
context of anti-abortion leafleting. 77 In the 1997 decision of Schenck v.
Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, for instance, an injunction that
created fixed buffer zones that prevented leafleters and protestors from
approaching within fifteen feet of health clinic doorways was upheld on the
ground that it served a significant government interest in securing
"unimpeded ... access to ... clinics." 78 The injunction also promoted
interests such as ensuring public safety and order, protecting the free flow
of traffic, safeguarding property rights, and upholding a woman's freedom
72 See Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (stating that a State may "by general and non-
discriminatory legislation" regulate the times, places and manner of soliciting information to protect the
"peace, good order and comfort of the community"); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 785
(1989) ("[E]ven in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time,
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."')
(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
73 See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
74 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988).
75 452 U.S. 640, 643, 648 (1981).
76 Id. at 649-50.
77 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475
(1996); see Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams, 10 Cal. 4th 1009 (1995) (holding that a
permanent injunction imposing place restrictions on the picketing activities of anti-abortion activists
was proper where the restrictions were content neutral, supported a significant state interest, and
burdened no more speech than necessary).
78 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997).
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to seek pregnancy-related services. 79 Similarly, in the 2000 decision of Hill
v. Colorado, a regulation forbidding leafleters who were within one
hundred feet of a health care facility to come within eight feet of another
person without first receiving that person's consent was considered
constitutional because it served significant government interests in ensuring
safety and unobstructed access for patients entering such facilities. 80 The
Court recognized a privacy interest for unwilling listeners to avoid
unwanted communications, noting that privacy interests are "far less
important 'when strolling through Central Park' than when 'in the confines
of one's own home,' or [other situations] when persons are powerless to
avoid" the communication. 81 The Court found that the statute protected
"those who enter a health care facility from the harassment, the nuisance,
the persistent importuning . .. and the implied threat of physical touching
that can accompany an unwelcome approach" by a person wishing to
"thrust an undesired handbill upon her."82 These cases reflect the notion
that government interests can validate limits on speech in nonpublic fora
and, even occasionally, in public fora.
II. THE SPLIT AMONG CIRCUIT COURTS REGARDING VEHICLE LEAFLETING
BANS
Courts have been confused about how to apply the public forum doctrine
to municipal time, place, and manner restrictions on vehicle leafleting.
This Section highlights the facts and rationales of Circuit Court decisions
that have addressed this issue. Each court analyzed the government
regulations using a three-part test that assessed the reasonableness of time,
place, or manner restrictions.83 Under this test, speech restrictions must: (1)
be content-neutral, (2) be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 84 Section A discusses the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Krantz v. City of Fort Smith, which struck down a city ordinance that
prohibited leafleting of vehicles parked on public property.85 Section B
79 Id.
80 Hill, 530 U.S. at 725-26.
81 Id. at 716 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971)).
82 Id. at 724.
83 See infra Part fl.A-D.
84 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-800 (1989) (setting forth the time, place,
and manner test); see also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985) (holding that neutral
regulations that control the time, place, and manner of expression are permissible so long as the neutral
regulation would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation).
85 160 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir. 1998).
460
FROM THE WNDSHIELD TO THE PA VEMENT
explores Horina v. City of Granite City, where the Seventh Circuit
invalidated an ordinance that banned leafleting of cars parked on city
streets. 86 Section C examines the recent Ninth Circuit decision of Klein v.
City of San Clemente that invalidated a similar ordinance. 87 Lastly, Section
D reviews the Fifth Circuit's decision in Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, which
differed from its sister circuits by upholding an ordinance that banned
vehicle leafleting. 88
A. The Eighth Circuit: Krantz v. City ofForth Smith
The plaintiffs in Krantz were church members who were arrested or
threatened with arrest for placing religious literature under the windshield
wipers of unattended vehicles that were parked on public property.89 A
series of ordinances from four cities had made it a misdemeanor to place a
handbill or advertisement on vehicles parked on public streets, but allowed
this practice if an occupant of the vehicle was willing to accept the
leaflet.90 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing
that the ordinances were facially unconstitutional because the ordinances
violated plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech. 91 Specifically, the
plaintiffs contended that the state interest in litter prevention could not
justify a complete ban on plaintiffs' speech activities. 92 The defendants
responded that the ordinances were narrowly tailored to serve significant
governmental interests and left open alternative forms of communication,
such as traditional leafleting. 93 While the defendants conceded that public
streets and parking lots were public fora, they maintained that the city had
the power to regulate activities "affecting the safety and aesthetics of such
public areas through direct or indirect regulation." 94 However, instead of
applying strict scrutiny for regulations occurring in public fora, the court
86 538 F.3d 624, 638 (7th Cir. 2008).
87 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).
88 409 F.3d 261, 273-74 (6th Cir. 2005).
89 Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1215.
90 Id. at 1216. One of the four ordinances, which all contained similar language, provided that: "It
shall be unlawful for any person to place or deposit any commercial or non-commercial handbill ...
upon any vehicle not his own, or in his possession, upon any public street, highway, sidewalk, road, [or]
alley within the City of Van Buren, providing, however, that it shall not be unlawful upon any such
street or other public place for a person to hand out and distribute to the receiver therefore, any handbill
to any occupant of the vehicle that is willing to accept it." Id.
91 Id
92 Id. at 1218.
93 Id
94 Id.
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applied the time, place, and manner test without any explanation. 95
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that the ordinances
were content-neutral, and accordingly the city satisfied the first prong of
the time, place, or manner test.96 As for the second prong, the court relied
on Schneider (which struck down an ordinance that forbade ringing a
doorbell or otherwise summoning a resident to the door to receive leaflets)
and Martin (which invalidated an ordinance that forbade door-to-door
leafleters) to hold that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest.97 This departed from the District Court's
reasoning, which held that the ordinances were narrowly tailored to achieve
a significant government interest because "unsightly litter is [a] blight in
this country the eradication of which requires the expenditure of limited
local government resources and presents a myriad of public health and
safety concerns." 98 The Eighth Circuit stressed that a court can take into
consideration the opportunity for the "would-be recipient to provide
effective notice that the communications are not wanted" in the narrow
tailoring analysis. 99 This factor influenced the court to strike down the
ordinance as overbroad, because it reasoned that those who do not want
leaflets placed on their cars can "quite easily and effectively provide notice,
for example, by placing a sign on the dashboard." 00
Finally, the court held that the government failed to demonstrate a
"reasonable fit" between its asserted goal and the means it used to
accomplish that goal.101 Despite evidence that government officials had
received complaints regarding leaflets left on cars, the court held that the
government did not establish a "factual basis for concluding that a cause-
and-effect relationship actually exist[ed] between the placement of
handbills on parked cars and litter that impacts the health, safety, or
aesthetic well-being of the defendant cities."102 Therefore, the ordinances
were deemed unconstitutional because they suppressed "substantially more
speech that [was] necessary" to accomplish their asserted purpose. 103
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1219.
97 Id.; see supra Part I.B. I for a discussion of Schneider and Martin.
98 Krantz, 160 F.3d at 1217.
99 Id. at 1220.
100 Id.
101 Id at 1221.
102 Id. at 1221-22.
103 Id. at 1222.
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B. The Seventh Circuit: Horina v. City of Granite City
The Seventh Circuit in Horina employed a similar rationale as the Eighth
Circuit to strike down an ordinance that stated, in relevant part: "No person
shall deposit or throw any handbill in or upon any vehicle . .. [or] deposit,
place, or throw any handbill upon any private premises which are
temporarily or continuously unoccupied."' 04 While the court considered the
city's asserted interests in preventing litter, intrusion, trespass, and
harassment substantial, the court could not accept the city's argument that
common sense dictated that the ordinance was needed to combat these
problems. 05 The court did not necessarily require empirical evidence, but
held that the government "must proffer something showing that the
restriction actually serves a government interest," and that in this case, the
city had introduced "absolutely no evidence" that the ordinance would
prevent litter, intrusion, trespass, and harassment. 106 The court likewise did
not accept the city's argument that other states and cities have similar
restrictions, because it revealed nothing regarding the specific defendant
city.'0 7 Thus, the court held that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored,
and that the ordinance failed to provide adequate alternatives. 08 Although
the ordinance left persons with the opportunity for traditional leafleting or
door-to-door leafleting, the court did not find these alternatives "realistic"
because they "require a speaker significantly . .. more time to reach the
same audience."1 09
Horina differed from Krantz in that the parties had not conceded that
vehicles were public fora. Rather, the city argued that the windshields of
privately owned automobiles and privately unoccupied buildings
constituted a nonpublic forum, and thus should only be assessed for
reasonableness.110 The court disagreed on the grounds that this analysis
only applies when a government restricts speech "on property that the
government itself owns," and emphasized that the term nonpublic forum "is
not synonymous with privately owned property." I Thus, the court applied
the time, place, and manner test because it considered vehicles private
104 Horina v. City of Granite City, 538 F.3d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting section 2(c) of the
challenged ordinance).
105 Id. at 633.
106 Id. at 633-34.
107 Id. at 634.
108 Id. at 635-36.
109 Id at 636.
110 Id. at 632.
Ill Id
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property. In the court's view, because the city had not shown sufficiently
the connection between its regulation and the eradication of litter or
intrusion, the court held that the city failed the time, place, and manner test
and struck down the ordinance as unconstitutional.112
C. The Ninth Circuit: Klein v. City of San Clemente
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit relied on Krantz and Horina to
invalidate a similar statute, which stated in relevant part: "No person shall
throw or deposit any commercial or noncommercial advertisement in or
upon any vehicle." 1 l3 Like the statute in Krantz, this ordinance allowed
persons to leaflet to occupants of vehicles who were willing to accept the
documents.114 The city contended that the ordinance preserved the
aesthetics of the community by curbing litter and visual blight, and
protected against the unauthorized use of private property. 15
Like Krantz and Horina, the court in Klein held that the city had not
provided any evidence that placing leaflets on cars caused litter.
Specifically, the court stated that the city would have to show "some nexus
between leaflets placed on vehicles and a resulting substantial increase in
litter on the streets" before the court could hold that the ordinances were
justified.11 6 Thus, the city had the burden of showing not only that such
leafleting created litter, but that it created "an abundance of litter
significantly beyond the amount the [c]ity already manag[ed] to clean
up."I 17
The court also deemed the city's interest in "preserving an individual's
right to decide how and when [his] private property will be used"
insufficient.11 8 As in Krantz, the court found that the ordinance prohibited
persons from distributing leaflets to those who might want to receive such
speech, even if they were absent at the time of distribution.11 9 As to
unwilling recipients, the court considered the burden on these persons
minimal, stating that "the mere fact that [a person] must take the
unsolicited leaflet from her windshield and place it in the garbage cannot
112 Id.at636.
113 Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Section 8.40.130
of the City's municipal code).
114 Id
115 Id. at 1201-02.
116 Id. at 1202.
117 Id. at 1203.
118 Id. at 1204.
119 Id.
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justify an across-the-board restriction." 20
According to the court, the city could also allow potential recipients to
opt-out of receiving leaflets, just as homeowners can opt-out of door-to-
door soliciting through the use of "No Solicitations" signs.121 The court
recognized that vehicles are entitled to "less assiduous" protection than
homes, which have always been afforded "a higher degree of privacy under
our law," thus if privacy interests could not justify door-to-door solicitation
bans, it likewise could not justify an outright ban against vehicle
leafleting.122 Ultimately, the court held that the ordinances were
unconstitutional. 123 Under the time, place, and manner test, the ordinances
were not narrowly tailored because the court did not consider the city's
interests in preventing litter and the unauthorized use of private property
significant.124
D. The Sixth Circuit: Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg
While Klein and Horina followed the reasoning of Krantz regarding the
evidentiary showing needed to prove a significant government interest in
litter prevention, Jobe declined to follow Krantz in this respect. 125 The
ordinance at issue in Jobe prohibited persons to place, deposit, or affix
"any handbill, sign, poster, advertisement, or notice of any kind
whatsoever" to "any automobile or other vehicle . . . without first having
secured in writing the consent of the owner thereof."l 26 The court held that
this was a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of speech, and
thus upheld the ordinance. 127
The plaintiff argued that his leafleting occurred on cars parked on public
streets, while the city argued that his leafleting occurred on privately
owned cars. 128 Relying on Taxpayers for Vincent, the court agreed with the
defendants, reasoning that if the public forum doctrine "does not apply to
public items (e.g., utility poles) permanently located on public streets and
sidewalks, it assuredly does not apply to private cars temporarily parked on
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1205.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1207.
124 Id at 1208.
125 See Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d, 261 (6th Cir. 2005); see also discussion supra Part
IIA-C.
126 Jobe, 409 F.3d at 263.
127 See id. at 268.
128 Id at 266.
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public streets."1 29 The court further stated that there was no "traditional
right of access" to car windshields and that vehicle leafleting is not
analogous to the forms of communication that have "long taken place on
our 'public streets and parks.' "130 Thus, since the court concluded that
vehicles were not public fora, it applied the traditional time, place, and
manner test instead of strict scrutiny.131 The court noted, however, that an
argument could have been made that the protection of private property
rights mandated a lower standard of review, but the parties did not make
such an argument.132
The court accepted the city's asserted interests of preventing litter, visual
blight, and protecting the unauthorized use of private property as
significant.133 The court held that the "common-sense explanations for
these types of laws" did not require proof that these problems occurred in
the past or were presently necessary, because this would be a "daunting
task" for the government.134 The court recognized that this ordinance was
enacted in 1952, and that there might have been an absence of information
due to the passage of time, and that it would be difficult for the city to show
the "empirical necessity for a law that has been in place for more than 50
years."135 Further, the court broadened littering to include the very act of
vehicle leafleting, stating that littering on private property "is not merely a
possible by-product of the activity, but is created by the medium of
expression itself."1 36 Therefore, the court held that the ordinance was
narrowly tailored to address the "substantive evil" of littering on both
private and public property.137
The court held that the ordinance also satisfied the third prong of the
time, place, and manner test by "leav[ing] open ample alternative channels
of communication."1 38 The court stated that plaintiffs could leaflet in the
same place by waiting in the parking lot and approaching car owners, that
they could solicit door-to-door, that they could mail information to
residents, or that they could leave leaflets at private residences so long as
129 Id. at 267 (emphasis in original).
130 Id. (quoting Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814
(1984)).
131 Id.
132 Id ("While one could argue that the protection of private property rights here calls for a lower
standard of review . .. that argument has not been made . .
133 Id. at 269-70.
134 Id. at 269.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id
138 Id. at 270.
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they were securely fastened to the door.139
After holding the ordinances constitutional, the court gave three reasons
why it declined to follow Krantz.140 First, Krantz did not consider vehicle
leafleting itself to be a form of littering.141 Second, Krantz ignored the
decision in Taxpayers for Vincent, which recognized that not all items on
public streets are automatically transformed into public fora.142 Third,
Krantz failed to account for the "fundamental difference" between
traditional leafleting and vehicle leafleting, which is that the car windshield
has not historically been used as a communicative tool, and the recipients
of leaflets under their car windshield have "no choice in accepting the
burden of disposing of it and no choice in peeling it off the windshield after
a rain shower."143
III. How COURTS SHOULD ADDRESS LEAFLETING REGULATIONS
This Section argues that the standard of review for vehicle leafleting
regulations should parallel the standard applied in nonpublic fora. Despite
arguments that cars should be treated like homes for free speech
purposes-because both are private property where the right to receive
speech must be protected-cars differ from homes in three significant
ways. First, there has never been a traditional right of access to a car the
way there has been for private residences. Second, more alternative forms
of communication exist to reach car owners than homeowners. Third, the
government exercises considerably more control over cars than it does
homes, as drivers are required to obtain a license, register their vehicle, and
get insurance before driving. Therefore, cars more closely resemble private
mailboxes, which have been considered nonpublic fora in the Supreme
Court's free speech analysis. Classifying vehicles as nonpublic fora will
bring uniformity and guidance to lower courts in evaluating vehicle
leafleting bans, and will give municipalities the deference they deserve.
139 Id
140 Id. at 273.
141 Id. at 273.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 271, 274.
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A. Vehicles Are Different From Residences And Are More Akin To
Mailboxes
a. There is No Traditional Right of Access to Car Windshields
The importance of door-to-door solicitation lies in the historical right of
access to a homeowner's doorstep. Traditionally, the home has been a
place where a homeowner receives company and collects information, and
the front door has symbolized a homeowner's consent to a visitor's
entry.144 Because of this, it has been argued that speech regulations
involving the home can be analyzed similarly to regulations in the public
forum, where speakers also have a right of access to willing listeners.145 Of
course, regulations of home solicitations are not absolute, and a
homeowner also has the right to exclude any kind of communication on his
or her property.146 Some have viewed the homeowners' right to exclude as
a basis for treating homes similar to the nonpublic forum, but this has been
considered unpersuasive because the argument ignores the traditional right
of access to the home. 147 This traditional right of access has been
continually recognized in the Supreme Court's door-to-door solicitation
cases, which have stated that when a homeowner's desires are unknown, a
speaker's right to seek entry falls within the ambit of the First
Amendment. 148
Unlike a homeowner's front door, a car windshield has never had a
traditional right of access.149 This is not for lack of historical longevity-
144 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951) (stating that "[i]t is true that the knocker on
the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers. . . ."); Jobe, 409 F.3d at 272 (recognizing that the "well-trodden path
to the front door" exists to encourage communication).
145 See Hirschhorn, supra note 32, at 1154 ("Private property that is held open by the homeowner
is similar to the public forum. Both are places where speakers traditionally have access to willing
listeners. This similarity is the basis for the argument that the standard of review for regulations of
solicitation on private property must parallel the standard applied in the public forum."); see also Dean
v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding the right to engage in residential picketing just
outside the home by analyzing the speech according to the same standard typically applied to speech
within the public forum).
146 See Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) ("There is, of
course, no absolute right under the Federal Constitution to enter on the private premises of another and
knock on a door for any purpose"); Wis. Action Coal. v. City of Kenosha, 767 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th
Cir. 1985) (positing that the peaceful enjoyment of one's home is a legitimate governmental objective
sufficient to support regulation of door-to-door solicitation and canvassing).
147 See Hirschhorn, supra note 32, at 1154 (noting that the argument equating private property with
nonpublic fora "fails to consider the traditional right to seek access to open private property."); but see
City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1576 (7th Cir. 1986) (making the argument
for analogizing the nonpublic forum with private property) (Coffey, J., dissenting).
148 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
149 Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, 272 (2005) ("[T]he windshield wiper does not exist,
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Mary Anderson's first patent for the device was issued in 1903 and
windshield wipers became standard equipment on all American cars in
1916.150 The purpose of the invention was to prevent drivers from having
to reach outside their windows in bad weather to clear their front
windshield.' 5 Conversely, Joseph Henry's invention of the electronic
doorbell in 1831 was intended to alert a homeowner to the presence of
visitors wishing to gain access to the home. 152 Given that the practice of
leafleting has been used since the 1800s, predating both of these inventions
as well as the invention of the first gasoline-powered American automobile
in 1891,153 it is significant that courts have never recognized a traditional
right of access to car windshields, or any other historical forms of
transportation for that matter, the way they have for homes.1 54 This is
probably because a car windshield, unlike the front door to a home, does
not symbolize a driver's consent to receiving visitors or information.155
Thus, analogizing cars to homes for the purposes of analyzing restrictions
on speech is improper because the traditional right of access that justifies
formally or informally, to encourage communication."); Klein v. City of San Clemente, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 87328 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting Jobe).
150 See JEAN F. BLASHFIELD, WOMEN INVENTORS 12-13 (1996) (identifying Mary Anderson as the
patentee of the windshield wiper in 1903, but stating that the device did not sell until 1916, when a man
copied the invention after Anderson's patent rights had lapsed); PAUL NIEMANN, MORE INVENTION
MYSTERIES: 52 LITTLE-KNowN TRUE STORIES BEHIND WELL-KNowN INVENTIONS 21 (2006) (stating
that Mary Anderson came up with the idea in 1903 and it took about ten years to become standard
equipment).
151 See BLASHFIELD, supra note 150, at 10 (explaining that Mary Anderson contemplated the fact
that streetcars had to run every day, in all kinds of weather); NEIMANN, supra note 150 (explaining that,
after watching a streetcar driver repeatedly lean out the window to wipe snow from the front of the car,
Anderson thought there must be a better way to contend with bad weather).
152 See BETHANNE PATRICK & JOHN THOMPSON, AN UNCOMMON HISTORY OF COMMON THINGS
146 (2008) (describing the function of a doorbell as a signal "to gain access to a home or other
building" and identifying Joseph Henry, a distinguished scientist who was the first secretary of the
Smithsonian Institution, as the inventor of the electronic doorbell in 1831); FRANK P. BACHMAN,
GREAT INVENTORS AND THEIR INVENTIONS 78 (1918) (discussing the mechanism tht makes a doorbell
work and naming Joseph Henry as the inventor).
153 The first gasoline-powered automobile was dubbed the "Lambert car," after the automobile's
creator, John W. Lambert. See Automobile History, About.com: Inventors -Famous Automobile
Makers, at http://inventors.about.com/od/astartinventors/tp/Famous-Automobile-Makers-.htm.
154 See Brief in Opposition at 9, Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261 (2005) (No. 05-188)
("Neither Krantz nor any other case has identified any 'traditional right of access' to private motor
vehicles, or for that matter their progenitors: privately owned horses, wagons, carriages or bicycles.
Handbilling is far from cutting edge technology and motor vehicles are only the latest step in our
'mobile society."') (emphasis in original); see also Members of City Counsel of L.A. v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (rejecting reliance on public forum principles for failing to
demonstrate "the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles . . .
comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks").
155 See Jobe, 409 F.3d at 270 ("There is nothing special about a car - or for that matter, about a
bicycle, a baby stroller, an individual's back or a lawn - that invites others to place leaflets or
advertisements on it without the owner's consent"); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162
(1939) (discussing, in the context of leafletting on public streets, that some people are willing recipients
of the information being distributed).
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higher speech protection for homes is not present for cars.
Requiring vehicle owners to place a "no solicitation" sign on the
dashboard, like those that are placed on the door or window of private
residences, is an impractical burden to place on drivers. If the signs are too
small, solicitors will not see them, yet if they are large, such signs may
create safety hazards by impairing the driver's vision. Moreover, drivers
that live outside of these cities would have no need for these kinds of signs
otherwise and hence might not know about them. Thus, out of town drivers
entering the city and wishing to have their vehicles remain free from
unwanted leaflets would have to obtain or carry one of these signs when
they happened to park inside cities with "no solicitation" requirements.
Putting this kind of burden on drivers would be unnecessary, impractical,
and unsafe.
b. More Alternative Forms of Communication Are Available to Reach
Vehicle Users
There are more options available to reach car owners than there are to
reach homeowners. For example, drivers typically wait in line to enter or
exit public parking garages, giving solicitors ample opportunity to reach
numerous car owners that remain free to accept or reject the leaflets. 156
Even in private parking garages, automobiles are required to come to a
complete stop, making it easy for solicitors to approach drivers.157
Approaching vehicles at stoplights, whether on the passenger or the driver
side, is also a convenient and more direct way to distribute leaflets to
drivers. Additionally, time restrictions for parking on city streets put
canvassers on notice as to what time car owners must move their cars in
order to avoid getting ticketed. If solicitors want to reach a group of
vehicles in a given area, all they need do is solicit on the streets around the
designated times that cars are allowed to park. These opportunities are
unavailable to reach those in private residences.
Most importantly, upholding vehicle leafleting bans will not foreclose
156 Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 28 n. 11, Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d
1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-55015) ("[R]esidents of private houses do not have to queue up to
enter or leave public garages or lots where they can be handed leaflets if they are willing to accept
them[.]"); see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1972) (discussing the ease with which
literature could be given to a driver who has stopped his car to enter or exit a private parking lot).
157 See Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1972) ("When moving to and from the privately
owned parking lots, automobiles are required by law to come to a complete stop. Handbills may be
distributed conveniently to pedestrians, and also to occupants of automobiles, from these public
sidewalks and streets."); see also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (reaffirming the traditional notion
that public streets were the domain of the people and could be used as a forum for discussion);
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162 (noting that some people willingly receive proffered leaflets).
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leafleting in its most venerable form.15 8 Solicitors may still leaflet along the
public streets where cars are parked, or inside parking lots to willing
passersby, and can also wait in such parking lots until drivers return, all of
which enables solicitors to communicate in the exact same areas.159 They
can leaflet door-to-door in any given community, or mail the information to
residents in the city. They may also stand and advertise in the desired areas
with large signs, or temporarily place signs around the parking garages.160
These alternatives will still enable solicitors to reach their intended
audience. Furthermore, they are adequate substitutes to the medium of
expression closed off by the ordinances, because they provide an even
more direct and effective means of communicating. Leaflets have less of a
chance of reaching their target audience because they may be blown off of
an unoccupied vehicle before the driver ever sees it. Since a leaflet that is
placed under the windshield wiper is susceptible to being blown off by
wind, rain, or even by an unaware driver who turns the wipers on, there is
no guarantee that even those who would be willing to accept it will actually
receive it. Therefore, these alternative forms of communication provide
more protection for the willing listeners' right to receive speech, not less,
because they ensure that leaflets end up in the hands of these listeners
instead of in the street as litter.
c. The Government Has Extensive Control Over Vehicles
Since the government has a substantial amount of authority to regulate
vehicles, it is not inappropriate for the government to also regulate the kind
of speech that can be placed on such vehicles. In South Dakota v.
Opperman, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment allows for
warrantless car searches because "automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected
to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls." 61 For
158 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
159 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 727 (2000) (recognizing that a statute that required
leafleters to remain eight feet away from persons entering a health care facility did not "prevent the
leafletter from simply standing near the path of pedestrians and proffering his or her material, which the
pedestrians [could] easily accept."); see also Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981) (upholding a state fair regulation that required a religious organization
desiring to distrubite literature to conduct that activity only at an assigned location due to "the State's
interest in confining distribution, selling, and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations").
160 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) (striking city ordinance that banned all
residential signs except those falling within exemptions because it "almost completely foreclosed
venerable means of communication that is both unique and important"); see also Jamison v. Texas, 318
U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (holding invalid an ordinance that completely banned the door-to-door
distribution of literature).
161 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
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example, car owners must abide by a plethora of registration, 162
inspection,163 licensing,164 and insurance requirements.165 In addition,
drivers understand that they may be stopped at any time for violating traffic
laws.166 In particular, when drivers park their vehicles on city streets or in
city parking lots, the government controls where, when, and for how long a
given automobile can remain parked, and failure to obey these parking
regulations will result in either a ticket or a driver's car being towed at his
or her expense. Further, the Ninth Circuit recently held in United States v.
Pinedo-Moreno that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment for
federal agents to secretly plant a GPS locator on one's car without a
warrant, even if it is parked in a private driveway.167
As the Supreme Court recognized in California v. Carney, the public is
"fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of
th[e] compelling governmental need for regulation. Historically,
'individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be
stopped and searched[.]' "168 On the other hand, the occupants of homes
are shielded from these exercises of government discretion while in the
security of their dwellings, since "protecting the well-being, tranquility and
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized
162 See Carprice.com, Driving Legal Requirements & Laws (2011), http://www.carprice.com/legal-
requirements. Car owners must apply for registration with the Department of Motor Vehicles in any
given state in order to drive. Registration requirements vary from state to state. Typically, an owner
needs a signed certificate of title for the vehicle, proof of insurance, a driver's license, and a home
address in order to register. An auto title is a legal certificate of ownership that shows who the owner of
the vehicle is. It lists the current owner's name and address, the make, model, and year of the car, as
well as the date of sale. Id; see also DMV.org, The Unofficial DMY Guide (1999-2011),
http://www.dmv.org.
163 See e.g., New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Safety Inspection, available at
http://www.nydmv.state.ny.us/vehsafe.htm (explaining the vehicle inspection requirements for New
York); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979) (ruling that states have a vital interest in
confirming that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection requirements are followed).
164 See Carprice.com, supra note 162. Before an individual is allowed to drive, one must obtain a
driver's license. Age requirements vary from state to state, ranging from 16-18. Additionally,
dealerships must be licensed with the state in order to sell cars; see also Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658.
165 See Carprice.com, supra note 162 ("It is illegal to drive a car in the USA without the minimum
levels of insurance required for each state."); see also Collins v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., No. 10-13344,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2011) (noting how insurance minimum
requirements vary across states and drivers may be subject to such requirements).
166 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (noting that the public is "fully aware" that
it is accorded less privacy with regard to vehicles, since historically, "individuals always [have] been on
notice that movable vessels can be stopped and searched") (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 806 n.8 (1982)); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925).
167 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010). The court emphasized that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy to a driveway or "curtilage of a residence," nor to the "undercarriage" of a
vehicle, nor to cars parked on a street or in a parking lot.
168 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 n.8 (1982)).
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society."l 69 As the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
illustrated, vehicles are much more heavily regulated than are homes, and
thus vehicles are "obviously" more public in nature. 170
Further, some activities are legal to partake in when inside one's home,
but not inside one's car. In New York, for example, operating a motor
vehicle while intoxicated "upon public highways, private roads open to
motor vehicle traffic [or] any other parking lot" 71 is a misdemeanor that
can result in suspension or revocation of a driver's license in addition to a
potential fine or imprisonment.172 Additionally, under section 154 of the
United States Code, each State must pass a law that "prohibits the
possession of any open alcoholic beverage container, or the consumption of
any alcoholic beverage" in any motor vehicle located on a "public
highway, or the right-of-way of a public highway, in the State."l 73 Under
section 920 of the United States Code, indecent exposure is prohibited "in
any place where the conduct involved may reasonably be expected to be
viewed by people other than members of the actor's family or
household."74 Hence, by simply stepping outside the confines of one's
own home and into an vehicle-a place where a person's conduct can
readily be seen by others-one potentially becomes subject to a host of
criminal liability, which further highlights the more public nature of a car.
Therefore, contrary to the Seventh Circuit's decision, the defendants in
Horina were not mistaken in characterizing vehicles as nonpublic fora,
since automobiles can be considered the government's property, not private
property-especially when they are parked on city streets or in city parking
lots. Accordingly, vehicle leafleting ordinances should be subject only to
rational-basis review because local governments should be given deference
when regulating speech in nonpublic fora.
169 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
170 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). "The expectations of privacy as to
automobiles is further diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel." Id. The Court
went on to hold that a routine inventory search of the defendant's locked automobile was not an
"unreasonable" search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 376.
171 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (2009). The statute defines "parking lot" for the purposes of
this section as "any area or areas of private property, including a driveway, near or contiguous to and
provided in connection with premises and used as a means of access to and egress from a public
highway to such premises and having a capacity for the parking of four or more motor vehicles. The
provisions of this section shall not apply to any area or areas of private property comprising all or part
of property on which is situation a one or two family residence." Id.
172 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1193 (2010).
173 23 U.S.C.A. § 154(b)(1) (2005).
174 10 U.S.C.A. § 920(n) (2007).
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d. The Same Degree of Government Control Exists in Cars And
Mailboxes, And Leafleting Interferes Equally With The
Functions of Both
Cars are more analogous to residential mailboxes for the purposes of free
speech analysis than to homes. In Council of Greenburgh, the Court
acknowledged that postal customers pay for the physical components of
their mailboxes, but also agree to abide by the Postal Service's regulations
in exchange for the delivery and pickup of the customers' mail.175
Similarly, while an individual purchases his or her own vehicle, that
individual also agrees to abide by the Department of Motor Vehicle's
regulations in order to enjoy the privilege of driving on government-
provided roads, as previously discussed.176
While distributing leaflets door-to-door does little to interfere with the
functioning of a home, unlimited leafleting on cars and mailboxes can have
burdensome consequences. For example, leaflets on car windshields
physically block a driver's vision and disable the windshield itself from
functioning properly. Similarly, if unsolicited leaflets are allowed to be
deposited into mailboxes in addition to stamped mailings, eventually a
mailbox will become overstuffed, impairing its utility. Despite this loss of
function, drivers as well as those who receive mail have no way to prevent
unwanted leaflets, because most of the time, no one is around their car or
their mailbox. However, homeowners have more opportunities to avoid
unwelcome leaflets because solicitors must ring their doorbell and greet the
occupants of a home in order to distribute materials. Thus, while in a
home, the occupant has the power to exclude visitors-and the leaflets they
may bring. Cars and mailboxes do not give individuals this same option.
I Since the government exercises just as much control over vehicles as it
does mailboxes, and regulates vehicles far more than it does individual
homes, courts should consider vehicles, like mailboxes, to be nonpublic
fora when analyzing vehicle leafleting ordinances. As regulations of
nonpublic fora, ordinances banning vehicle leafleting should only be
subject to rational-basis review to determine whether they are reasonable,
and should not be scrutinized under the time, place, and manner test.
B. Deference to Municipalities is Appropriate
Giving deference to municipalities that enact vehicle leafleting bans is
175 See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
176 See supra Part III.A-3.
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appropriate because cities are in the best position to recognize the needs of
their citizens and the community at large. Local governments possess an
inherent authority, through its police powers, to impose reasonable
restrictions on private rights for the sake of general public welfare, health,
safety, order, and security.177 This is because local governments can most
effectively balance the general needs of the citizens within their
territories.178 Most importantly, if individuals within a given jurisdiction do
not agree with local government regulations, they are free to voice their
concerns, contact local government officials, or vote against officials they
feel are not adequately representing their needs.179 These devices ensure
that local governments will pay attention to the public's concerns and
reactions, thereby giving them leeway to use an investigational approach in
assessing how individual rights are to be preserved when they enact laws
for the general public.180
Solicitation regulations in streets and other public places fall within the
local governments' police powers.181 As the Court in Berman v. Parker
recognized as early as 1954, "[i]t is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled."l 82
Vehicle leafleting regulations are a legitimate exercise of these police
powers. In this instance, local governments have determined that the
unauthorized placing of leaflets on vehicles parked on city streets and in
177 See M. DAVID GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 357 (1984) ("Local governments often invoke their police power as a basis for various
regulations designed to maintain public order"); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed.
1990) (defining "police power").
178 See CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW: TAKINGS, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 312 (Alan T.
Ackerman & Darius W. Dynkowski eds., 2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW]
("In support of its decision to defer to legislative decisions regarding public use, the [Rehnquist] Court
notes that state and local governments have a better understanding of their area and the needs of their
constituents"); Magaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U.L REV. 698, 721
(2011).
179 See CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW, supra note 178, at 312 (noting that it is easier for people
to contact local policiticans and have their voices heard); see also Marci Hamilton, Federalism and the
Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND.
L.J. 311, 320 (2003) (discussing that local governments both provide more opportunity for input from
the people and creates greater accountability from the politicians).
180 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (indicating varied needs in different parts
of the nation and "great respect" the Court owes to state legislatures in determining local public needs);
see also CURRENT CONDEMNATION LAW, supra note 178, at 315 (noting that courts may be following
an "experimental approach" when they allow States to reach various solutions to the public use question
in takings law).
181 Hynes v. Mayor & Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); GELFAND, supra note 177, at
358 ("[L]ocal governments regulate the use of streets and other public areas for solicitation, advertising,
and demonstrations.").
182 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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city parking lots is an annoyance to individuals, and a visual blight for the
general public. As the facts of Krantz and Horina illustrate, cities receive
complaints regarding vehicle leaflets.1 83 Given the political accountability
that local governments have, their response to these complaints should be
deferred to.
C. Rationality Review Will Resolve a Direct Circuit Split
Courts that have struck down bans on vehicle leafleting have recognized
that while it may be debatable whether the prevention of littering is a
significant interest under the time, place, and manner test, it is beyond
debate that it is a legitimate state interest. 184 Therefore, in most cases, as in
other areas of the law, rational basis review will have the effect of
validating these kinds of bans, which will promote judicial efficiency and
uniformity. Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari review on the issue
of vehicle leafleting in 2005,185 lower court cases have become the law.
Establishing a presumption of legitimacy for litter prevention will give
lower courts more guidance and consistency and will enable higher courts
to make precedent.
While this standard may be criticized as being too deferential, it will still
require cities to prove that their regulations are reasonable. This standard
will not simply require courts to take judicial notice, even though this has
been done in areas of the law dealing with constitutional rights that are as
just historically important. 186 For instance, if a city's vehicle leafleting
regulation forecloses too many avenues of communication, or is content-
based, it will likely be found unreasonable.
183 See supra Part ILA-B; see also Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 13-14, Klein v. City
of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-55015) (noting that the plaintiff presented
evidence that "many intended recipients would be angry to the point of belligerence, threats and
violence when offered leaflets").
184 See Krantz v. City of Forth Smith, 160 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir.) ("Nor do we disagree with
defendants' assertion that they may, consistent with prevailing constitutional standards, protect
legitimate aesthetic and safety interests through indirect regulations that impose some burden on
speech."); Van Nuys Publ'g Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 489 P.2d 809, 821 (Cal. 1971) (referring to
litter prevention as a "legitimate and, indeed an increasingly urgent, government objective");
Answering Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 33, Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
2009) (No. 08-55015) ("Of course, here, even [plaintiff] concedes that preventing litter is a legitimate
government interest, while the City has shown that it is a significant one.").
185 Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg, 409 F.3d 261, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 876 (2005).
186 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 199 (2008) (taking judicial notice
of the State's interest in deterring and detecting voter fraud in a challenge to a state law requiring
government issued photo identification to vote as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment); Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (recognizing that the plaintiffs strong interest in exercising "the
'fundamental political right' to vote countered the State's compelling interest in preventing voter
fraud.") (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
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CONCLUSION
Classifying vehicles as nonpublic fora will bring uniformity to lower
courts that have had difficulty categorizing vehicles within the public
forum framework. Since nonpublic fora are scrutinized under rationality
review where a legitimate interest is needed, placing vehicles in this
category will resolve the ongoing battle between Circuit Courts as to
whether or not litter prevention is a significant government interest.
Significant governmental interests are unnecessary under rational-basis
review, because municipalities are given deference in areas where their
legitimate police powers are exercised. This will allow local governments
to judge whether litter prevention is needed in their particular jurisdictions
and whether their constituents desire these kinds of bans. It will respect the
decision of states like New York, where the Court of Appeals has
interpreted its free speech clause broadly, as well as the thirty-eight other
cities that have enacted vehicle leafleting bans.187 This level of review also
accounts for the many alternative forms of communication that are still left
available to potential vehicle-leafleters. Indeed, one Circuit Court judge
has already acknowledged that a lower form of review is appropriate with
regard to vehicle leafleting.188
Most importantly, rational-basis review accounts for the fundamental
difference in the government's control over vehicles and over homes.
While the government's control over cars and mailboxes is pervasive, it has
much less authority to regulate actions in and around homes. Therefore, it
makes sense for courts to consider vehicles, like mailboxes, nonpublic fora
in analyzing vehicle leafleting bans-especially when they are parked on
city streets or in city parking lots. As a result, ordinances that forbid
vehicle leafleting will be subject to rational-basis review and local
governments-who exercise a great amount of control over such
vehicles-will be given the deference they deserve.
187 See Jobe, 409 F.3d at 274 (listing all of the cities that have enacted vehicle leafleting bans);
People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d. 527, 530 (1976).
188 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. It should be noted that while Judge Sutton agreed
that vehicle leafleting ordinances should be scrutinized under rational-basis review, he did so because
he considered vehicles private property, not nonpublic fora. See Jobe v. City of Catlettsburg 409 F.3d
261, 267 (5th Cir. 2005).
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